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Instability in the Middle East

Paul Pillar
Monday, Apr 29, 2024

Several implications can be more confidently drawn from the events of the past two weeks and hold lessons for US policy:

The US disinclination to say ‘no’ to Israel encourages reckless and destabilizing Israeli behavior. The most destructive such behavior during the past year has been what Israel has been doing to the Gaza Strip, but the attack on the Iranian embassy compound was an extension of that. Failure to flash any red lights to Israeli decision-makers gets taken as an implied green light. Lavishing aid without conditions has conditioned those decision-makers to expect that Israel will not suffer any consequences no matter what it does.

Using military force to change the narrative works, and the technique probably will be used again. Probably a primary objective of Israel’s attack on the Iranian embassy was to provoke an Iranian counterattack that would divert the international spotlight from the catastrophic Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip and turn it to what other regional states, especially loathed Iran, do to Israel. The tactic succeeded. Media coverage and political discussion about the Middle East promptly became much less about what was happening in Gaza and more about Iranian missiles fired at Israel. Much of that coverage and discussion treated the Iranian action as if it were a bolt out of the blue, barely mentioning that it was retaliation for an Israeli attack on an Iranian embassy. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government must be pleased with that result, and have been given reason to use the tactic again.

Except for Israel, Middle Eastern states do not want a wider war. Arab states do not want it, and clearly Iran does not either. Discussion in general terms about whether the United States is staying in the Middle East, whether it is leaving a ‘vacuum’, and how regional states are dissatisfied with the level of US commitment often overlooks this fact. Middle Eastern states generally want serious US engagement to address problems of the region but generally do not want (again with the exception of Israel) more US military activity in their backyard and with it more war.

Offense is different from defense. The former is likely to be destabilizing in ways that the latter may not be. Although many military capabilities can be applied to either offensive or defensive purposes, the Biden administration, to its credit, drew a clear distinction between the two in the recent crisis. It reaffirmed US commitment to Israel’s security and even participated in shooting down Iranian missiles and drones while making clear it wanted no part in any offensive action against Iran. Unfortunately, US military aid to Israel, including the additional $14 billion that is part of the aid package that President Biden just signed, is likely to be used more offensively than defensively, especially as long as the Israeli assault on Gaza continues.

Excerpted: ‘Israel Seems to Be the Only Country Looking for a Wider Middle East War’. Courtesy: Commondreams.org