India’s Afghan gambit

On January 8, 2025, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi, acting foreign minister of Afghanistan, in Dubai.

This meeting marked the highest-level engagement between the interim government in Kabul and New Delhi since the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan in 2021.

During their discussion, India expressed interest in humanitarian assistance and economic rebuilding of Afghanistan, especially establishing a link with the Chabahar port in Iran. The Afghan side acknowledged India’s security concerns regarding terrorist threats.

The Misri-Muttaqi meeting signifies India’s measured transition from anti-Taliban stance to pro-Taliban diplomacy, which is influenced by the Taliban’s engagements with other regional actors. Historically, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, India supported the Soviet Union. When the Taliban gained power after the Soviet departure, India refrained from recognising their government.

Even when the US forces were stationed in Afghanistan, India supported anti-Taliban factions, such as the Northern Alliance, and cooperated with Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s government. During this time, India built infrastructure like the Zaranj-Delaram Highway to facilitate trade between Afghanistan, Iran and India. However, the highway remained a target of frequent Taliban attacks.

As soon as the US and Nato forces left Afghanistan, the Indian mission in Kabul evacuated due to fear of their security under the Taliban regime. India held an antagonistic posture towards the Taliban for nearly four decades.

Although the Taliban were not entirely a pro-Pakistan entity, India assumed them to be a proxy of Pakistan and supported anti-Taliban fractions.

After 2021, India cautiously observed Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan before entering. India gradually started establishing the base of post-2021 Indo-Taliban ties. Indian envoys established contact with the Taliban representatives and interacted in Doha, Abu Dhabi, Kabul and New Delhi. Several Indian businessmen expressed interest in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and mining Afghanistan’s iron ore, copper, gold, rare-earth minerals and hydrocarbons.

New Delhi even paused the operations of the Afghan government’s mission in New Delhi in favour of the Taliban. These encounters were also possible because India was looking to enhance regional influence after losing popular support, and the Taliban were keen on international engagement and investment. However, this was kept low-key.

India’s newfound inclination to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban without recognition stems from the complex dynamics of the Islamabad-Taliban relationship. Owing to the inability of the Taliban to fulfil the pledges of the Doha Agreement, terror groups continue to seek sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

Reportedly, Pakistan was forced to take kinetic measures against these entities. The terror groups not only get trained in Afghanistan but also enjoy the Taliban’s support, and use Afghan soil to launch terror attacks inside Pakistan as per the UN Sanctions Monitoring Team report.

As the aspects that contribute to instability in Pakistan often align with India's strategic interests, India’s quest to expand its influence to Afghanistan cashed in on the low phase of the Taliban-Pakistan relationship. To complement the occasion, India even issued a rare pro-Taliban statement post-strikes, which is new for India.

New Delhi apprehended that the absence of influence over the Taliban and from Afghanistan limited India’s eyes and ears on the ground, and its ability to monitor Pakistan-related developments. Therefore, India returned to Afghanistan in June 2022 with a ‘technical team’. However, the purpose was to reestablish the disrupted intelligence and financing links with proxies against Pakistan.

The rise of the Taliban was anticipated to empower ideologically similar groups, leading to a surge in terrorist activities. Pakistan claims to have proof that the Indian government and its intelligence agency, RAW, funds and fuels instability and hybrid warfare through groups like the TTP and Balochistan separatists. India also uses its diplomatic missions in Kabul and Jalalabad, close to Pakistan’s western borders, to support such activities in an attempt to encircle Pakistan.

India’s strategy appears twofold: it aims to threaten the national security of Pakistan from both the east and the west while simultaneously targeting Chinese infrastructure and citizens in Pakistan. Experts believe India has adopted the classic strategy of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’ amid lows in Pakistan-Taliban relations. The Taliban must tactfully gauge India’s opportunistic diplomacy as it would dominate their bilateral relations. It is pertinent not to get carried away by gestures with zero-sum objectives, especially if an underlying intention is to damage Pakistan’s interest.

New Delhi needs a realisation that instability in Afghanistan is in no one's interests as it means an ideal ecosystem for terrorist outfits and camps that not only destabilise Pakistan but also impact India. Several hundred Indian-origin Mujahideen are also trained by Afghanistan-based groups.

While opposing and competing strategic interests persist, there is a need to ensure unanimous support for initiatives that could deactivate the terror breeding camps based in Afghanistan that harm national interests.

The writer is a research analyst in emerging technologies and

international security. She tweets/posts @MaheenShafeeq